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Business Cycle Dependent Unemployment Insurance
* 
 
The consequences of business cycle contingencies in unemployment insurance systems are 
considered in a search-matching model allowing for shifts between “good” and “bad” states of 
nature. We show that not only is there an insurance argument for such contingencies, but 
there may also be an incentive argument. Since benefits may be less distortionary in a 
recession than a boom, it follows that counter-cyclical benefits reduce average distortions 
compared to state independent benefits. We show that optimal (utilitarian) benefits are 
counter-cyclical and may reduce the structural (average) unemployment rate, although the 
variability of unemployment may increase. 
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assistance. 1 Introduction
Optimal unemployment insurance systems trade o⁄ incentives and insurance. Since unem-
ployment risk is intimately related to the business cycle situation, one often ￿nds calls for
improved bene￿t generosity in periods with slack labour markets1. The standard argument
against is that this will reinforce distortions and therefore come at the costs of an increase in
structural unemployment. However, as the gains from unemployment insurance in general are
dependent on the state of nature, so are distortions. We show in a standard search-matching
framework that the distortions of search incentives created by unemployment insurance may
be larger in periods with low than high unemployment. Hence, there may both be an in-
surance and incentive argument for making bene￿ts depending on the state of nature in a
counter-cyclical fashion; that is, bene￿t generosity is high when unemployment is high, and
low when unemployment is low.
However, the key parameters of unemployment schemes are business cycle independent
in most countries. Though, there are cases where elements of the unemployment insurance
system are explicitly linked to the state of the labour market. Probably the most sophisticated
scheme is found in Canada where bene￿t eligibility, levels, and duration depend on the level of
unemployment according to pre-determined rules2. The US has a system of extended bene￿t
duration in high unemployment periods (see Committee on Way and Means (2004)). Some
countries have pursued a more discretionary approach - in some cases in a semi automatic
fashion3 - by adjusting labour market policies to the state of the labour market; i.e. extending
bene￿ts or labour market policies in general in high unemployment periods, and tightening
the schemes in periods with low unemployment.
There is a large literature on the design of unemployment insurance schemes. Since
Baily (1978) it is well-known that the optimal bene￿t level trades o⁄ insurance and incen-
tives. Recent work has extended these insights in various directions (for a survey see e.g.
Frederiksson and Holmlund (2006)). Surprisingly, there is neither a large theoretical liter-
ature on the e⁄ects of business cycle dependent unemployment insurance nor an empirical
1The issue of business cycle contingencies in unemployment insurance has gained further interest in
perspective of the downturn induced by the ￿nancial crisis. Calls for increases in unemployment bene￿ts or
extension of bene￿t duration have been made by e.g. the IMF and the OECD (see Spilimbergo et al. (2008)
and OECD (2009)), and if such changes are made, it is an important issue whether they should be made
contingent on the business cycle to prevent that these changes become permanent. OECD (2009) reports
that 15 countries have made unemployment bene￿ts more generous as a response to the crisis, and in many
countries additional steps have been taken towards support for jobless.
2See http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/ei/menu/eihome.shtml.
3Sweden is an example of a country which has used labour market policies in this way.
2literature4 exploring the state of nature dependencies in the e⁄ects of various labour market
policies including the bene￿t level. Kiley (2003) and Sanchez (2008) argue within a search
framework that the initial bene￿t level should be higher and its negative duration depen-
dence weaker in a business cycle downturn compared to an upturn. Both models are partial
and rely on the assumption that bene￿ts are more distortionary in a boom5. In Andersen
and Svarer (2010), it is shown that the optimality of counter-cyclical bene￿t levels depends
not only on the possibility of using the public budget as a bu⁄er but also on the extent
to which distortions move pro-cyclically. If this is the case, counter-cyclical unemployment
bene￿ts may also contribute to lower the structural (average) unemployment rate. However,
the model is static and does not allow for changes in the business cycle situation.
This paper develops a general equilibrium search-matching model in which the business
cycle situation may change between "good" and "bad" states of nature6. Matching frictions
imply a co-existence of unemployed persons and vacant jobs, but the underlying job sepa-
ration rates and job ￿nding rates are business cycle dependent. The unemployment bene￿t
scheme is tax ￿nanced, and bene￿ts are allowed to be business cycle dependent. Since the
main issue in this paper is the trade-o⁄between insurance and incentive, the model is cast in
such a way that it focuses on how unemployment bene￿ts a⁄ect job search incentives. The
paper addresses both the positive issue of how such state contingencies a⁄ect labour market
performance and the normative issue of the optimal (utilitarian) state of nature contingencies
to build into unemployment insurance schemes7.
In the search context considered in this paper, the response of job search to both un-
employment bene￿ts and the business cycle situation plays a crucial role. It is shown that
the distortion of search incentives caused by bene￿ts tends to be business cycle dependent
in a pro-cyclical way; i.e. a high bene￿t level distorts incentives more in a good than a bad
business cycle situation. At the same time, insurance arguments may call for counter-cyclical
4The few exceptions are: Mo¢ tt (1985), Arulampalam and Stewart (1995), Jurajda and Tannery (2003),
and Rłed and Zhang (2005), see section 2.
5In a related study, Costain and Reiter (2005) analyse a business cycle model with exogenous search
state, allowing for contingencies in social security contributions levied on ￿rms and unemployment bene￿ts.
In this model the public budget does not need to balance in each state due to contingent assets traded with
risk neutral capitalists. It is shown that it is optimal to have pro-cyclical social security contributions, while
bene￿ts are almost state invariant.
6The main modelling di¢ culty here is to ensure stationarity of public ￿nances under a tax ￿nanced
unemployment insurance scheme. This is done by the speci￿c assumptions concerning state transitions and
the tax policy.
7In addition, business cycle dependent unemployment bene￿ts would also strengthen automatic stabilizers,
which may have e⁄ects via aggregate demand e⁄ects. Such e⁄ects do not arise in the present framework,
which focuses on the structural consequences of business cycle dependent bene￿t levels.
3bene￿t levels. This has two important implications, namely, ￿rst that optimal bene￿ts may
be counter-cyclical, and second that the structural (average) unemployment rate could be
lower with business cycle contingent compared to business cycle independent bene￿ts. How-
ever, as a consequence the actual unemployment rate may become more variable.
In addition, it is shown that accounting explicitly for business cycle ￿ uctuations has an
important e⁄ect on search behaviour and therefore on unemployment and other key variables.
The reason is that agents perceive the possibility of a change in the business cycle situation,
and this a⁄ects the search behaviour of the unemployed. Clearly, this e⁄ect depends on both
the di⁄erence between the two states of nature and the likelihood of a change in the business
cycle situation. This may even imply that counter-cyclical bene￿ts increase search e⁄ort
in both states of nature, and therefore cause a fall in unemployment in both states. This
arises if the business cycle situation is not too persistent, in which case agents in a downturn
expect a shift to an upturn with a higher job ￿nding rate.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we introduce a search model with business
cycle ￿ uctuations. The issue of business cycle dependent incentive and insurance e⁄ects are
analysed in section 3. The consequences of business cycle dependent bene￿ts are addressed
in section 4, while section 5 considers optimal bene￿ts for a utilitarian policy maker. A few
concluding remarks are given in section 6.
2 A search matching model with business cycles
Consider a standard search matching model of the Pissarides-Mortensen type in discrete time
(see e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000)). To economize on notation,
we suppress the time index, which is possible since interest is con￿ned to stationary equilibria
(see Appendix A). All workers are ex-ante identical and have the same productivity. Workers
search for jobs, but a matching friction implies that unemployment and vacancies coexist.
Firms create vacancies, and ￿lled jobs are destructed by some probability.
We assume that the economy shifts between two states, good (G) and bad (B), according
to a Markow process with the following symmetric and stationary transition probability
4matrix8
presentnpast state B G
B ￿ 1 ￿ ￿
G 1 ￿ ￿ ￿
where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1.9 If the economy is in a boom (recession), this state of nature may continue
with probability ￿ and terminate and turn into a recession (boom) with probability 1 ￿ ￿.
Hence, ￿ is also a measure of the persistence in the current business cycle situation. Given
this assumption we consider a stationary Markov equilibrium to the model.
The job separation rate p is in the four possible states of nature given as follows
presentnpast state B G
B pBB pBG
G pGB pGG < pBB
i.e. the basic transition is between a regime with a low level (pGG) or a high level (pBB > pGG)
of job separations10. Upon transition there is an extraordinarily high (pBG > pBB) or low
(pGB < pGG) level of job separations (see below)11.
There is an unemployment bene￿t scheme providing a ￿ ow bene￿t b to unemployed
workers, and it is ￿nanced by a proportional wage income tax (￿) and a lump sum tax
(T) (see below). The inclusion of lump sum taxes facilitates the analysis involving four
possible states of nature in a setting which does not impose a balanced budget requirement
for each state of nature. The key problem is that the debt level in general will display path
dependence violating the possibility of having a stationary Markov equilibrium12. To cope
8We assume a symmetric transition matrix to simplify the analysis. Empirical evidence indicates some
asymmetry with more persistence in good than in bad business cycle situations. The estimated value of ￿
in discrete models on quarterly data is in the range 0.7 to 0.9, see Hamilton (1994). In a three state model
(recession, normal and high growth), somewhat higher levels of persistence are found, see Artis et al. (2004).
9Note that the unconditional stationary probability of being in a given state B or G is Pr(G) = Pr(B) = 1
2.
The unconditional probabilities of the four possible states are: Pr(BB) = Pr(GG) = 1
2￿ and Pr(GB) =
Pr(BG) = 1
2(1 ￿ ￿):
10Di⁄erences in the business cycle situation may be generated by changing other variables in the model
like job creation, the costs of vacancies, matching e¢ ciency etc., but the qualitative results would be the
same, see Andersen and Svarer (2010).
11There has been some debate on the extent to which changes in the job separation rate are a driver of
unemployment ￿ uctuations, especially in the US (see Shimer (2005)). Elsby et al. (2008) ￿nd that the US is
an outlier compared to other OECD countries where ￿ uctuations in both in￿ ow and out￿ ow rates are found
to be important.
12This is so since the initial debt level depends on the past history of the economy if the budget is allowed
not to balance in each state of nature. The budget requirements to ensure debt sustainability are in general
path dependent.
5with this and to ensure stable debt levels, policies will in general have to be path dependent.
This problem is addressed via the lump sum tax. The income tax rate is assumed state
independent, while the bene￿t level may depend on whether the state is "good" or "bad".
Note that there are no marginal labour supply decisions (intensive margin) in the following,
hence the use of lump sum taxation does not a⁄ect any results, but serves the purpose
of making the analysis more simple and transparent. Search is a⁄ected by the gains from
employment and thus net taxes and bene￿ts.
2.1 Individual utility and search e⁄ort
Consider an in￿nite number of identical households, and normalize the population size to
unity. Employed workers receive a wage w and work l hours. Both w and l are business
cycle independent, and the instantaneous utility is assumed to be separable in the utility
from consumption (￿rst term) and leisure (second term), i.e.
￿(w;￿;Tij) ￿ g (w[1 ￿ ￿] ￿ Tij) + f(1 ￿ l)
where ￿ is the income tax rate, and Tij is the lump sum tax paid if the current state is
i and the previous state j. Working hours l are exogenous, and the time endowment has
been normalized to 1. Both g() and f() are concave increasing functions. The instantaneous
utility for unemployed is similarly assumed separable over consumption and leisure and given
by
￿(bi;Tij;sij) ￿ g (bi ￿ Tij) + f(1 ￿ sij)
where sij is time spent searching for a job if the current state is i and the previous state j.13
Note that the separability assumption ensures that search is not dependent on current income
(see below)14. In addition, note that the bene￿t level only takes two values conditional on
the current state, whereas the lump sum tax also depends on the past state. This results in
four di⁄erent levels of net compensation to the unemployed.
Value functions
The value functions for being employed when the current state is bad and the past state
was either good or bad are in stationary equilibrium given as (see Appendix A)
13The underlying utility function is assumed to be the same for employed and unemployed workers. In
a more general formulation, stigmatization and other factors may cause both the utility from income to
depend on its source and the disutility from work to depend on the type of time use. In an earlier version,
we allowed for such di⁄erences, but they did not have any qualitative implications for the results.








































BG = ￿(w;￿;TBG) +
￿
W E


































where ￿ is the subjective discount rate. Similar value functions exist when the current
state is good. To save space these are delegated to the appendix A.
Similarly, the value functions for current unemployed workers when the current state is








































BG = ￿(bB;TBG;sBG) +
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Again similar value functions for when the current state is good can be found in the appendix.
We focus solely on risk sharing via the unemployment insurance scheme. One issue is
the role private savings may play as a bu⁄er and thus self-insurance mechanism15. Allowing
for interaction between di⁄erent forms of insurance will complicate the analysis, and since
risk diversi￿cation o⁄ered by savings is incomplete16, we focus only on the unemployment
insurance scheme17.
15The issue of how individual savings can be a bu⁄er and thus a form of self-insurance in the case of
unemployment has been analysed in relation to unemployment insurance bene￿ts in e.g. Lenz and Tran￿s
(2005) and the wider context of so-called welfare accounts by Bovenberg, Hansen and Słrensen (2008).
16The scope for self-insurance via savings is restricted both due to capital market imperfections a⁄ecting the
scope for intertemporal diversi￿cation and the fact that savings and accumulation of wealth do not provide
much insurance for young workers (see e.g. Bailey (1976) and Chetty (2008)). Empirical evidence shows
that unemployment is associated with reductions in consumption, and that a large fraction of unemployed
are liquidity constrained, see e.g. Gruber (1997) and Bloemen and Stancanelli (2005). The argument that
risk diversi￿cation via savings is incomplete is here taken to the limit.
17However, note that in the special case where utility functions over consumption are linear (
g (w[1 ￿ ￿] ￿ Tij) = w[1 ￿ ￿] ￿ Tij and g(bi ￿ Tij) = bi ￿ Tij) and the discount rate ￿ is interpreted as
the market rate of interest, the value functions equal the expected present value of income (net of disutility
from work/search). This special case can therefore be interpreted as re￿ ecting a situation with a perfect
capital market allowing individuals to smooth consumption via saving/dissaving.
7Job Search
Individuals choose search e⁄ort sij to maximize W U
ij, taking all "macro" variables as
given. Current search may result in a job match the next period. The ￿rst order conditions
to the search problem when the current state is bad read18
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Similar relations hold for the good state.
Note that search depends, in the usual way, on the gain from shifting from unemployment
into a job in the next period in the case of as successful job match. However, since the
business cycle situation may change, job search depends on the gain from ￿nding a job if
remaining in the current state (probability ￿) and the gain if there is a shift in the state of
nature (probability 1 ￿ ￿). The higher ￿, the more search is a⁄ected by the current state,
and vice versa.
It follows immediately that search is independent of the past state of nature, and hence
there are only two levels of search, i.e.
sBB = sBG = sB
sGG = sGB = sG
The intuition is that the search decision is forward-looking since current search in￿ uences
the future labour market status, and therefore it is independent of the past state19.
2.2 Firms
A ￿lled job generates an output (exogenous) y, and ￿rms can create job vacancies at a
￿ ow cost of ky (k > 0). A ￿lled job may be destroyed in the next period if there is a job
separation. The value of a ￿lled job in a given state of nature is
18Concavity of the f function ensures that the second order conditions are ful￿lled.



























































Note that the value of a ￿lled job does not depend on the past state. A vacant job may be


























































where qi denotes the probability of ￿lling a vacant job in state i (see below). Vacancies are
created up to the point where the value of a vacancy is zero, i.e. JV
G = JV










i.e. the relative value of having a ￿lled job in either state (B or G) depends on the ratio of
the job ￿nding rates, and JE
G > JE
B if qB > qG, or vice versa. Hence, the value of a ￿lled job
is higher in the G state than in the B state, provided the job ￿lling rate is lower qG < qB.
The intuition is that the more di¢ cult it is to ￿ll a vacant job, the higher is the value of a












Wages are assumed to be set in a Nash-bargain after a match has been made. Employed
workers are represented by unions having the objective of maximizing wages for employed
workers. As has been argued in non-cooperative approaches to justify this bargaining model,
the relevant outside option is what can be achieved during delay in reaching an agreement
(see Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinski (1986)). This outside option is assumed to be zero
for both workers and ￿rms, and hence the wage setting problem is given as the solution to
Maxw [w]
￿ [y ￿ w]
1￿￿
9where 0 < ￿ < 1. The bargaining power of ￿rms is thus ￿, and for workers (1 ￿ ￿). This
wage setting model implies that the wage is given as
w = ￿y (6)
The main attraction of this approach is that it gives a simple wage relation which implies
that the wage is rigid across states of nature20. Alternative routes may be pursued in
modelling wage rigidities (see e.g. Hall (2005) and Hall and Milgrom (2008) for recent work
in a search matching context), and the speci￿c formulation adopted here is to be considered
as an illustrative workhorse model. The crucial property is that wages do not respond to
variations in unemployment (job separations etc.)21.
2.4 Public sector
The public sector provides the bene￿t level bi to unemployed in a given state of nature i and
￿nances this by a proportional tax rate ￿ and a (path dependent) lump sum tax Tij. The
income tax rate ￿ is assumed to be constant across states of nature; i.e. any business cycle
dependency runs via the bene￿t level and the lump sum tax.
The primary budget balance in any state is
Bij = (1 ￿ uij)￿w + Tij ￿ biuij:
Hence, the debt level D when the current state is bad (similar expressions when the current
state is good are easily derived) is:
￿
1 + ￿






DBG = bBuBG ￿ ￿w(1 ￿ uBG) ￿ TBG +
￿
1 + ￿




Since the primary budget is dependent on the current state of nature, nothing ensures
that the debt level is stationary. A sequence of bad draws in combination with debt servicing
may lead to a non-sustainable debt level. Several budget policies contingent on the debt level
could be conceived to ensure that the intertemporal budget constraint for the public sector
is ful￿lled. To ￿nd a stationary Markov equilibrium, we choose here a simpler procedure and
20The issue of the cyclical properties of wages is a controversial question in macroeconomics. However, the
empirical evidence on cyclical properties of wages is inconclusive (see e.g. Abraham & Haltivanger (1995)
and Messina et al. (2009)).
21Allowing for wages to be di⁄erent across states of nature may contribute to dampen unemployment
variations via lower wages in downturns and higher wages in upturns, see e.g. Coles and Masters (2007).
10propose a tax policy rule and an implied budget pro￿le, ensuring that each state of nature
is associated with a well-de￿ned and ￿nite debt level. Therefore this policy is sustainable
and introduces risk sharing via the public budget, but clearly it is dominated by more
sophisticated policies. Accordingly the gains from risk sharing across states of nature are
downward biased in the following.
Speci￿cally, consider the following rule for the state contingent lump sum taxes
Tij = biuij ￿ ￿w(1 ￿ uij) for i;j = fB;Gg:
It can be shown that this policy ensures a stationary debt level in all states of nature, and
thus satis￿es the no-Ponzi condition (see Appendix B).
The policy rule outlined above implies that the primary balance is given as
BBB = 0
BBG = [bGuGB ￿ ￿w(1 ￿ uGB)] ￿ [bBuBG ￿ ￿w(1 ￿ uBG)]
BGB = [bBuBG ￿ ￿w(1 ￿ uBG)] ￿ [bGuGB ￿ ￿w(1 ￿ uGB)]
BGG = 0
Hence if uBG > uGB and/or bB > bG (see below), a budget de￿cit arises when a bad state
follows a good state (BBG < 0), and a budget surplus arises when a good state follows a
bad state (BGB > 0). If the state of nature is unchanged, the budget is in balance. It is
thus implied that there is an across state of nature insurance mechanism when the state of
nature changes, but not when it persists. Broadly speaking, this captures that transitory
shocks can be diversi￿ed, while persistent shocks can not.
2.5 Matching
Vacant job may be ￿lled with a one period lag, and matches are determined by a standard






ij ;0 < " < 1
where Vi is the number of vacancies in state i, and aggregate search is given as
Sij = siuij









Sij measures market tightness, and ￿(￿ij), ￿0
￿(￿ij) > 0.











2.6 In￿ ows and out￿ ows
The unemployment rate is a stock variable displaying inertia due to the matching fric-
tion. Hence, in general the unemployment rate adjusts sluggishly to changes in the state
of nature22, and therefore it displays path dependence. A stationary Markov equilibrium is
ensured if it is assumed that job separation rates di⁄er at state transitions, so as to ensure
that the unemployment rate only takes on two values, uB and uG. The intuition is that
if there is a shift from the "good" to the "bad" state, there is an extraordinarily high job
separation rate, and vice versa when shifting from a "bad" to a "good" equilibrium. Hence,
uBG = uBB = uB
uGB = uGG = uG
The change in unemployment is given as the di⁄erence between job separations and hires.
Hence, to ensure that the economy ￿ uctuates between two levels of unemployment uB and
uG for given exogenous job separation rates pBB and pGG, it is required that the following
restrictions are met
0 = (1 ￿ uB)pBB ￿ ￿BsBuB (7)
uG ￿ uB = (1 ￿ uB)pGB ￿ ￿GsGuG (8)
uB ￿ uG = (1 ￿ uG)pBG ￿ ￿BsBuB (9)
0 = (1 ￿ uG)pGG ￿ ￿GsGuG (10)
Note that ￿ and s only depend on the current state, and ui is the unemployment rate in
state i(= B;G). It is an implication that the above conditions determine pGB and pBG
23.








22See e.g. Pissarides and Mortensen (1994) and Shimer (2005) for business cycle versions of the search
model in which the unemployment rate evolves from the initial unemployment rate conditional on the
realization of shocks.
23Note that this makes the job separations at "switching" states a jump variable to ensure that unem-
ployment only varies between two levels.








It follows that uG￿uB < 0 implies that a shift from the G-state to the B-state is associated
with extraordinarily high job separations, i.e. pBG > pBB, and a shift from the B-state to the
G-state is associated with an extraordinarily low level of job separations24, i.e. pGB < pGG:
2.7 Equilibrium
In Appendix C it is proved that there exists a stationary Markov equilibrium in which
market tightness is larger in a good than a bad state of nature ￿G > ￿B. This implies that
i) unemployment is higher in a bad state than a good state, i.e. uB > uG, ii) the job ￿nding
rate is lower in a bad state ￿B < ￿G, iii) the job ￿lling rate is higher in a bad state qB > qG,




Below we present some numerical results to clarify various mechanisms, and they are based






f(1 ￿ l) = log(1 ￿ l)
where { = 4: Following Frederiksson & Holmlund (2006), among others, the matching
function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas of the form m = As1￿"v", with " = 0:5 and A = 0:29.
Time is quarterly, and we discount utility at ￿ = 0:003 and assume that workers spend 30%
of their time at work, l = 0:3: The tax rate is t = 0:01 and ￿ = 0:5: Finally, output is set to
y = 1; vacancy costs are set to k = 0:2.
3 Optimal business cycle dependent bene￿ts
We now turn to the issue of how unemployment bene￿ts should depend on the business cycle
situation. We follow standard practice and consider a utilitarian social welfare function. In
24Conditions ensuring that pGB > 0 are assumed ful￿lled.












where ￿ij is the ex ante unconditional probability of being in state (i;j) (
X
i;j=B;G ￿ij = 1),
and the value functions are evaluated for the tax payments implied by the budget constraints
























= 0 for k = B;G: (13)
2nd order conditions are assumed ful￿lled.
3.1 One state model
Although the main interest is to analyse the design of unemployment bene￿ts over the cycle,
it is useful to start by considering the one state version of the model to bring out some basic
points. This applies both in terms of interpreting the expression for optimal bene￿ts (13)
and in relation to stressing why an explicit modelling of business cycle shifts makes a crucial
di⁄erence.
Consider the one state version of the model, i.e. there is no shift in the state of nature
(￿ = 1), or alternatively that the job separation rate is state invariant (pBB = pGG = p) (for
details see Appendix D). In this case there exists a stationary equilibrium (see Appendix D)
with a given unemployment rate u and the budget balances. Equilibrium unemployment is
larger, the higher the job separation rate (@u
@p > 0), and the higher the bene￿t level (@u
@b > 0).















Note that in the one state case there is only one policy decision since if the compensation
to unemployed is determined, then the tax payment for the employed follows directly from
the budget constraint. The ￿rst order condition for the optimal bene￿t level can be rewritten


















This expression has a straightforward interpretation in terms of marginal gains and costs
of providing unemployment bene￿ts both measured in units of utilities. The LHS gives the
14marginal bene￿t as the di⁄erence in marginal utility of consumption for unemployed relative
to employed times the unemployment rate. The larger the di⁄erence in marginal utilities or
the unemployment rate, the larger the marginal gains from providing higher bene￿ts. The
RHS gives the marginal costs as the e⁄ects of bene￿ts on unemployment (the distortion)
times the utility gain from being employed rather than unemployed. If either the distortion
is large or the utility loss from being unemployed is large, the marginal costs of providing
bene￿ts are high.
The expression (14) thus implies that the marginal gains from unemployment bene￿ts
tend to be large in a state of nature with high unemployment, while the marginal costs are
low if the gain from being employed is small, and vice versa. These e⁄ects turn out to be
crucial when we allow for di⁄erent business cycle situations below.
To gain more insight into the e⁄ects involved, it is useful to consider the special case
where there is no distortion, i.e. @u
@b = 0 (follows if @s
@b = 0, i.e. no incentive e⁄ects of unem-








i.e. the optimal bene￿t level ensures that the marginal utility of income is the same for
employed and unemployed25. This is known as the "Borch condition" for full insurance
(Borch (1960)). The insurance e⁄ect is not directly related to the unemployment rate in this
case but depends on the conditions prevailing as either unemployed or employed. However,












i.e. a higher unemployment rate is accompanied by lower bene￿ts. The intuition is that
higher unemployment raises the ￿nancing requirements to maintain a given bene￿t level,
which in turn reduces the disposable income of employed and thus raises their marginal
utility of income. To rebalance the marginal utility of consumption between the two groups,
it is necessary to lower bene￿ts. While non-distortionary bene￿ts are a special case, this
shows that a one state model (implying a balanced budget requirement) tends to imply
pro-cyclical bene￿ts.
25Note that the participation constraint is implicitly assumed ful￿lled. Otherwise there is an additional





b) ￿ e(1 ￿ l)
￿
￿ [g(b) ￿ f(1 ￿ su)] = 0
15Returning to the role of distortions, the question is whether bene￿ts are more or less
distortionary in a situation with a high unemployment rate. The driver of the unemployment
rate in this model is the job separation rate (p), and hence the sign of @
@p
@u




@b > 0, it follows that bene￿ts are more distortionary with a high job separation rate
and thus unemployment rate, and this goes in the direction of making optimal bene￿ts pro-
cyclical, and vice versa for @
@p
@u
@b < 0. The distortion arises in this model via search, which











Hence, bene￿ts tend to increase unemployment (@u
@b > 0) because they make individuals
search less (@s
@b < 0). Note that the distortion of search matters more for the unemployment
e⁄ect if the unemployment rate is low. The sensitivity of the search distortion to the job
separation rate turns out to depend crucially on how search is a⁄ected by the job separation
rate. In Appendix E it is shown that for ￿(s) ￿
f00(￿)(1￿s)
f0(￿) to be constant (as assumed in the



























< 0, and therefore search is more distorted by a marginal bene￿t increase at a
high job separation rate (high unemployment level) than at a low job separation rate (low
unemployment rate). The fact that the one state model implies that job search moves pro-
cyclically therefore tends to imply that distortions move counter-cyclically. As is pointed
out below, when allowing for changes in the business cycle situation the search response may
be di⁄erent, and this has important implications for how the optimal bene￿t level depends
on the business cycle situation.
In sum, we ￿nd in the one state version of the model that both the budget e⁄ect and
the distortion e⁄ect tend to call for pro-cyclical bene￿t levels. However, this result arises
by comparing steady states, and as shown in the next section this changes when allowing
explicitly for changes in the business cycle situation, which both opens for risk diversi￿cation
across states of nature and a di⁄erent response of search and thus distortions to the bene￿t
level.
In Figure 1 we show the optimal bene￿t level in the one state model for the parameter
values presented above. The ￿gure shows as expected that equilibrium unemployment is
higher, the higher the job separation rate. The optimal bene￿t level (net compensation)
is seen to be decreasing in the job separation rate and thus falling in the unemployment
16rate. Hence, in the one state case optimal bene￿ts are pro-cyclical; if unemployment is high,
net compensation is low, and vice versa. The main driver behind this is the budget e⁄ect
discussed earlier.
Insert ￿gure 1 here
3.2 Two state model - insurance and distortions
Crucial in the two state model is the explicit modelling of changes in the business cycle
situation. The possibility of a business cycle change captured by ￿ (0 < ￿ < 1) a⁄ects
behaviour since these possible changes are anticipated by individuals. The following considers
this in detail both to explain the di⁄erence to the one state model and to work out the
implications for business cycle contingencies in unemployment bene￿ts.
Business cycles and search Job search is the key behaviourable variable, and its response
to the business cycle situation is crucial. The standard version of the matching model with
a stationary equilibrium (one state of nature) implies that a higher job separation rate and
thus unemployment rate is associated with less search (see above). Making inferences from a
comparison of stationary equilibria would thus lead to the conclusion that search is lower in
bad than in good states of nature. This conclusion does not hold when business cycle changes
are explicitly accounted for, and this underlines the need to model ￿ uctuations explicitly.
To see how changes in the business cycle a⁄ect job search, consider for the sake of
argument search in the bad state determined by (10)
f

















Two factors determine the return to job search, namely, the probability of ￿nding a job and
the gain from ￿nding a job. Both of these e⁄ects go in the direction of strengthening job
search in the bad state and weakening job search in the good state. To see this consider ￿rst
the ex ante perceived job ￿nding probability, which is given as the probability of being in a
given state of nature in the future times the job ￿nding rate in that state of nature. Suppose
for the sake of argument that W E
BB ￿ W U
BB = W E
GB ￿ W U
GB, in which case it follows that the
possibility of shifting to the "good" state (0 < ￿ < 1) will increase search in the "bad" state
compared to a situation with no chance of a change in the business cycle situation (￿ = 1).
Since ￿G > ￿B, we have
￿￿B + (1 ￿ ￿)￿G > ￿B for all ￿ < 1
i.e. the possibility of a shift to a state with a higher job ￿nding rate increases, other things
being equal, the search level, and the e⁄ect is stronger, the larger the di⁄erence in job ￿nding
17rates between the two states. The e⁄ect is obviously the opposite for search in the good state
of nature, i.e.
￿￿G + (1 ￿ ￿)￿B < ￿G for all ￿ < 1.
Moreover, shifting business cycle situations a⁄ect the gain from having a job (W E￿W U).









￿ + [1 ￿ ￿](1 ￿ pGB ￿ ￿GsBB)
￿
W E
GB ￿ W U
GB
￿
￿ + 1 + ￿ [pBB + ￿BsBB ￿ 1]
where
￿ ￿ g(w[1 ￿ ￿] ￿ TBB) + f(1 ￿ l) ￿ g(bB ￿ TBB) + f(1 ￿ sBB)
is the instantaneous utility gain from being employed rather than unemployed. If there is










￿ + pBB + ￿BsBB
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Hence, using that W E



































Hence, the possibility that the business cycle situation might change tends to increase the
gain from having a job in the bad state of nature, and to decrease it in the god state of
nature. This goes in the direction of increasing search in the bad state and lowering it in
the good state26. In sum both the di⁄erence in the job ￿nding rates and the gains from
employment induced by shifts in the business cycle situation tend to induce more search in
the bad state, and less search in the good state.
The role of the business cycle situation for job search is illustrated in Figure 2 showing
on the x axis a widening of the di⁄erence in the job separation rate between the two states
of nature (zero di⁄erence corresponds to a one state model). It is seen that job search is
higher in bad states of nature. The di⁄erence widens as expected as the two states become
more di⁄erent.
Insert ￿gure 2 here
26Shimer (2004) similarly argues that search intensity need not be pro-cyclical in a discrete time setting,
focussing on the fact that job search is a⁄ected by how easy it is to ￿nd a job.
183.2.1 Business cycles and insurance
Turning to the insurance aspects, there are two dimensions of insurance. One is between the
employed and unemployed in a given state of nature. The other dimension is across states




ij = w(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ Tji = w ￿ (bB + ￿w)uij for i;j = fB;Gg
and for the unemployed
y
U
ij = bi ￿ Tji = bi + ￿w ￿ (bB + ￿w)uij for i;j = fB;Gg:
It is seen that in a given state of nature an increase in the bene￿t level increases the
disposable income of the unemployed and decreases it for the employed. By changing the
bene￿t level, it is thus possible to provide insurance (redistribute) between employed and
unemployed27. Second, by running a non-balanced budget in the swing states (GB and
BG), it is possible to insure across states of nature. In the present context, this possibility
arises when the state of nature changes, and it is seen that for bB > bG and uB > uG both
employed and unemployed are compensated when the state shifts from G to B, and vice
versa. The latter is also seen by considering how a change in the state of nature a⁄ects the




















= h(w[1 ￿ ￿] ￿ TGB) ￿ h(w[1 ￿ ￿] ￿ TGG):
Hence, if TBB > TBG and TGB > TGG, it follows that W E
BG > W E
BB and W E
GB < W E
GG; i.e.
employed are better o⁄ when a bad state follows a good state than when it follows a bad
state, and they are worse o⁄when a good state follows a bad state rather than a good state.
To put it di⁄erently, a shift from a good to a bad state is compensated, whereas a shift from
a bad to a good state implies a contribution.















g(bG ￿ TGB) ￿ g(bG ￿ TGG)
￿ + 1
27It is easily veri￿ed that it is not possible with the state dependent policy to achieve complete insurance
as de￿ned by the Borch condition for employed and unemployed across the four di⁄erent possible states of
nature.
19and if TBB > TBG and TGB > TGG, it follows that W U
BG > W U
BB and W U
GB < W U
GG; i.e.
unemployed are better o⁄ when a bad state follows a good rather than a bad state, and
worse o⁄ when a good state follows a bad rather than a good state.
3.2.2 Business cycle dependent distortions
The distortionary e⁄ects of the bene￿t level on unemployment are crucial for the optimal
bene￿t level (see also below). Intuitively, one would expect the bene￿t level to be more
distortionary in good states of nature with higher job ￿nding rates than in bad states of
nature. To address this issue, we can rewrite optimal search in a given state i from (1) and
(2) by the implicit function
si = ￿(zij) ￿
0 > 0

































where ￿(si) ￿ ￿
f00(1￿s)
f0(1￿s)(1 ￿ s) > 0. Assuming that the latter elasticity is constant (as is
the case in the numerical illustrations), we have that if unemployed search more in a bad










i.e. the elasticity of search wrt. the expected gain from becoming employed is smaller in a
bad than a good state; i.e. search tends to be less distorted in a bad than in a good state of
nature (see also section 3.1)
The following tables consider this issue and report the elasticities of search and unem-
ployment, respectively, with respect to the bene￿t level in the two possible states of nature.
Consider ￿rst search. As expected, higher bene￿ts lower search. There is both a direct
e⁄ect in the state of nature for which the change applies and an e⁄ect in the alternate state
since agents perceive the possible shift in the business cycle situation. The direct e⁄ect is
numerically larger in the good than in the bad state; i.e. search is a⁄ected more by bene￿ts
in good than in bad states of nature.
20Table 1: E⁄ects of changing bene￿ts: elasticity of search intensity wrt. bene￿t
level
￿ = 0:7 ￿ = 0:9
bB bG bB bG
Elasticity of search,
bad state: sB
￿1:58 ￿0:87 ￿1:87 ￿0:33
Elasticity of search,
good state: sG
￿0:90 ￿1:69 ￿0:34 ￿1:92
Note: pBB = 0:042 and pGG = 0:038:











and a similar relation holds for the good state (see Appendix E). Using this we can easily
characterize distortions in terms of unemployment e⁄ects, and table 2 provides numerical
illustrations. As should be expected, the direct e⁄ect is stronger, the more persistent the
business cycle situation, whereas the indirect e⁄ect on the alternate state is stronger, the less
persistent the business cycle situation. It is seen that the direct e⁄ect of bene￿t increases is
larger in good than in bad states of nature; i.e. the distortions are business cycle dependent,
and we have that they are larger in good than in bad states. This goes in the direction of
making optimal bene￿t levels business cycle dependent, and we explore this issue in the next
section.
21Table 2: E⁄ects of changing bene￿ts: elasticity of unemployment rate wrt. ben-
e￿t level
￿ = 0:7 ￿ = 0:9
bB bG bB bG
Elasticity of unemployment,
bad state: uB
1:47 0:83 1:72 0:35
Elasticity of unemployment,
good state: uG
0:88 1:61 0:36 1:79
Elasticity of mean
unemployment:u
1:20 1:18 1:07 1:04
Note: pBB= 0:042 and pGG= 0:038:
3.3 Optimal business cycle contingent bene￿ts
We can now return to the issue of how optimal bene￿ts depend on the business cycle situation;
that is, should they be counter-cyclical or pro-cyclical? Figure 3 shows how the optimal net
compensation (bene￿ts less taxes paid) for the four possible states of nature depends on the
underlying persistence in the business cycle situation28. It is seen that the net compensation
is highest when a bad state follows a good state, and the intuition is that unemployed are
compensated for the more bleak outlooks and lower possibilities of ￿nding a job. Oppositely,
we have the lowest net compensation when a good state follows a bad state. The net
compensation o⁄ered when the bad state persists (BB) is higher than when the good state
persists (GG). It is seen that the di⁄erences in net compensation are largest for intermediary
levels of persistence. The intuition is that the expected gains from shifting status become
lower in bad states and higher in good states of nature.
Insert ￿gure 3 here
Figure 4 shows that optimal business cycle dependent bene￿ts imply more variability in
unemployment rates than business cycle independent bene￿ts. The reason is that bene￿ts
are increased in bad times with high unemployment, and decreased in good times with low
employment. Hence, the optimal state contingent policy shifts compensation from good to
bad times, and search e⁄ort from bad to good times. In this way insurance and incentives
are better aligned with the business cycle situation.
28We present the optimal net compensation imposing a symmetry condition; that is, increases in bad
states equal decreases in good states. Considering whether optimal policies imply asymmetric adjustments,
we found only small di⁄erences to the symmetric case.
22Insert ￿gure 4 here
This shows that it is possible to improve the insurance properties by making bene￿t
levels business cycle dependent without causing an increase in the structural (average) un-
employment rate. However, this gain may be achieved at the cost of more variability in
unemployment.
4 Conclusion
In this paper the e⁄ects of making unemployment bene￿ts conditional on the business cycle
situation have been shown to depend not only on an insurance e⁄ect but also a budget
and an incentive (distortion) e⁄ect. We have shown in a stylized business cycle model that
the bene￿t level tends to distort more in good than in bad times, and this strengthens
the argument for counter-cyclical bene￿t levels. It is an important implication that such a
dependency is welfare improving (utilitarian) since it shifts utility for unemployed from good
to bad times. Moreover, it can reduce structural (average) unemployment, but it may imply
that the unemployment rate becomes more sensitive to the business cycle situation. The
present analysis therefore shows that a business cycle dependent unemployment insurance
system may provide better insurance without resulting in higher structural unemployment.
The preceding analysis considers a very stylized unemployment insurance scheme fo-
cussing entirely on the bene￿t level. In practice, it may be an equally important dimension
of the unemployment insurance to make the bene￿t duration business cycle contingent. We
conjecture that the case for such a business cycle dependency is qualitatively the same as
the one found in this paper for the bene￿t level.
There are several possible extensions of the current analysis. First, we completely ignore
aggregate demand e⁄ects (automatic stabilizers) of running a business cycle dependent pol-
icy. We conjecture that incorporation of this aspect will strengthen the case for having a
state dependent bene￿t level. Second, the model used in this paper relies on a very stylized
description of the business cycle and a somewhat rudimentary policy rule for diversi￿cation
across states of nature. It would be interesting to extend the model in these two dimensions
- something which we leave for future work.
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264.1 Appendix A: Value functions
Consider ￿rst the value functions for currently employed workers (W E
ij ) in a given current
state (i) and past state (j).
W
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Using that in stationary state W E
BB(t) = W E
BB for all t, and similarly for all other value
functions W x
i;j (x = e;u;i;j = B;G) we have
W
E



































































































which in stationary state can be written
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E























































































A similar procedure follows straightforwardly for the remaining value functions.
274.2 Appendix B: Stationary debt levels
To see that the proposed policy rule ensures stationary debt levels in all states, note that
the primary budget balance now can be written
BBB = 0
BBG = [bGuGB ￿ ￿w(1 ￿ uGB)] ￿ [bBuBG ￿ ￿w(1 ￿ uBG)]




i.e. if the public sector is running a budget de￿cit when a bad state of nature with high job
separations (BBG < 0) replaces a good state of nature with low job separations, then it will
run a similar surplus when a good state of nature replaces a bad state of nature. In this way
the scheme allows some risk diversi￿cation. To see that this is consistent with a stationary
debt level in any state of nature, observe further that
￿DGB = bGuGB ￿ ￿w(1 ￿ uGB) ￿ [bBuBG ￿ ￿w(1 ￿ uBG)]
+ ￿ [DGG ￿ DGB] + (1 ￿ ￿)[DBG ￿ DGB]
￿DBG = bBuBG ￿ ￿w(1 ￿ uBG) ￿ [bGuGB ￿ ￿w(1 ￿ uGB)]
+ ￿ [DBB ￿ DBG] + (1 ￿ ￿)[DGB ￿ DBG]
implying that
(￿ + ￿)[DGB + DBG] = ￿ [DGG + DBB]
and since we have from the debt level equation for DGG and DBB that
(￿ + 1 ￿ ￿)[DGG + DBB] = (1 ￿ ￿)[DGB + DBG]
it follows that
DGB + DBG = 0
DGG + DBB = 0:
The debt levels in the di⁄erent states of nature can be found by using that
￿DBB = bBuBB ￿ ￿w(1 ￿ uBB) ￿ TBB + (1 ￿ ￿)[DGB ￿ DBB]
￿DGB = bGuGB ￿ ￿w(1 ￿ uGB) ￿ TGB + ￿ [DGG ￿ DGB] + (1 ￿ ￿)[DBG ￿ DGB]
28which implies (by use of bBuBB ￿ ￿w(1 ￿ uBB) ￿ TBB = 0)
(￿ + 1 ￿ ￿)DBB = (1 ￿ ￿)DGB




￿ + ￿ + 2(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿ + 1 ￿ ￿
￿
[bGuGB ￿ ￿w(1 ￿ uGB) ￿ TGB]
￿1
which is ￿nite, and hence DBB;DBG, and DGG are ￿nite.
4.3 Appendix C: Proof of equilibrium to the two state model


















pGG > 1, it follows from a su¢ cient condition that uB > uG is
m(1;￿B)
m(1;￿G) < 1 or ￿B < ￿G.
From the value functions for a ￿lled job (3) and (4), we have by use of JV
G = JV





















































































G = y ￿ w
and h
￿ + ￿pBB + (1 ￿ ￿)
h





￿ + ￿pGG + (1 ￿ ￿)
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where the last equality follows from (5).
29Using (11) and (12), we have








Implying that (17) can be written
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and using (16), we get
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Condition (18) can now be written
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It is seen that the LHS of (19) is decreasing in
￿G
￿B, and the RHS is increasing in
￿G
￿B. It follows
that there is a unique solution to
￿G
￿B, from which all other variables can be found. To prove
that
￿G
￿B > 1, observe that for
￿G
￿B = 1 we have that the RHS of (19) equals one, whereas the
LHS is larger than one. Hence, it follows that
￿G
￿B > 1. Note that this implies
qG
qB < 1, and
hence uG < uB.
4.4 Appendix D: One state model
In the one state case (pBB = pGG = p), we have that the model is summarized by
Value function employed
￿




W U ￿ W E￿
Value function unemployed
￿
1+￿W U = g(b) + f(1 ￿ s) + ￿s
1+￿
￿
W E ￿ W U￿
Search f0(1 ￿ s) = ￿
1+￿
￿
W E ￿ W U￿
In￿ ow out￿ ow 0 = (1 ￿ u)p ￿ ￿(￿)su
Job ￿lling rate [￿ + p] k
q(￿) = 1 ￿ ￿
Budget balance (1 ￿ u)T = ub













= 1 ￿ ￿







































￿ + p + ￿s
￿
[g(w ￿ T) + f(1 ￿ l) ￿ [g(b) + f(1 ￿ s)]] (20)



























￿ < 0 and @s
@p
p


































W E ￿ W U￿
@p
p
[W E ￿ W U]
#
where ￿(s) ￿ ￿
f00()(1￿s)
f0() > 0.
From (20) we have
@
￿












@ (p + ￿s)
@p
(1 + ￿)[h(w ￿ T) + e(1 ￿ l) ￿ [g(b) + f(1 ￿ s)]]















@ (p + ￿s)
@p
￿
W E ￿ W U￿
(￿ + p + ￿s)
31Hence, using that f0() = ￿
1+￿
￿




W E ￿ W U￿
@p
p
[W E ￿ W U]
=
1
















































￿ + p + ￿s
￿
< 0












> 0 and hence @u
@p < 0.
Bene￿ts











i.e. the elasticity of unemployment wrt. the bene￿t level depends on the elasticity of search
































In the special case where @￿
















[h(w ￿ T) + e(1 ￿ l) ￿ [g(b) + f(1 ￿ s)]]
Assuming ￿(s) ￿ ￿
f00()(1￿s)











[h(w ￿ T) + e(1 ￿ l) ￿ [g(b) + f(1 ￿ s)]]
￿
f0()









[h(w ￿ T) + e(1 ￿ l) ￿ [g(b) + f(1 ￿ s)]]
￿
￿s(s ￿ 1) ￿ ￿ ￿ p










































































































The sign follows by noting that 1 + ￿b
f00()[￿+p+￿s]sf0() u
1￿u > 0 is required for stability. To
see the latter, note that search is a decreasing function of the tax rate, and that the tax rate
is a decreasing function of the search level. The former gives the chosen search level for a
given tax rate, and the latter is giving the required search to balance the budget for a given
tax rate.





f00()[￿ + p + ￿s]
< 0

















Stability requires that the required search level exceeds the chosen search level for a tax rate
























334.5 Appendix E: Distortions
















































































The last six equations determine the six endogenous variables: ￿B;￿G;uB;uG;pBG and pGB,
given the exogenous: pBB and pGG.














and similarly for the good state of nature.
344.6 Appendix F: Optimal bene￿ts
The optimal bene￿t level solves
Maxb ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ u)W
E + uW
U
This problem has the ￿rst order condition














and the second order condition
zb < 0
































































































35Figure 1: One state model: unemployment and net compensation to unemployed 
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Note: For 0 the job separation rates are pBB ￿ pGG ￿ 0.04, and for each step 0.01 is added to pBB and subtracted frompGG, and the persistence is
￿ ￿ 0.5.Figure 3: Business cycle dependent net compensation to unemployed and persistence 
 
 
Figure 4: Relative unemployment: constant vs business cycle dependent benefits 
 
Note: The figure shows the unemployment with business cycle dependent benefits relative to the level 
of unemployment in a model with business cycle independent benefits. The level of unemployment in 
the latter model is normalized to 1. 







































BB BG GG GB
Note: The net compensationis given as bi ￿ Tij. The optimal level is found inthe class of symmetric business cycle dependencies inbenefit levels; i.e. the
































Persistence = 0.7 Persistence = 0.9